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Targeting Employment Services
under the Workforce 
Investment Act
Stephen A. Wandner
U.S. Department of Labor
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 changed the em-
ployment policy landscape in America.  It reduced eligibility require-
ments for program participants, changed administrative relations
among service delivery agencies, and refocused systems for perfor-
mance accountability.  Taken together, these features are expected to in-
crease the volume of customers at local employment centers, require
frontline service delivery staff to perform a multitude of new functions,
and induce management to place an even greater emphasis on opera-
tional efficiency and program effectiveness.  Since the resources of the
workforce development system are limited, service referral must be ju-
dicious to achieve the greatest social return.
Under WIA, a premium is placed on serving customers effectively
and efficiently.  Consequently, frontline staff could benefit greatly from
tools that help to quickly identify customers who would benefit the
most from particular services.  The administrative process by which in-
dividuals are selected to participate in programs may be referred to as
“targeting.”
Targeting can be thought of as a selection and allocation process in
which a limited number of participants are selected from a broader pool
of eligible customers.  This selection process takes place in an environ-
ment where receipt of services is not an entitlement, and where the
number of potential program participants greatly exceeds the resource
capacity.  Employment services targeting can be done in either a formal
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or an informal way.  Targeting is either explicit or implicit.  Whenever
selection and allocation decisions are made, targeting is being done.
Traditionally, the process of selecting clients for program participa-
tion has been done informally; that is, without the aid of structured sta-
tistical models.  Informal targeting can take many forms.  Procedures
followed at the local level depend on budget and administrative condi-
tions, as well as on the information and assessment tools available to
frontline workers in the workforce development system.  The result
may be a first come, first served approach.  It may be done by purchas-
ing blocks of services, and then finding customers to fill the available
slots.  It may also be done by an active outreach process, such as the use
of rapid response teams that serve future dislocated workers before lay-
offs occur for large publicly known enterprises.  In most cases, infor-
mal targeting is not systematic and uses little or no objective data to
make program referral decisions.  Informal targeting is frequently time-
sensitive, seasonal, and driven by funding cycles.
Formal targeting involves having frontline staff in employment
centers use targeting tools that are based on previously analyzed pat-
terns of service receipt and reemployment success.  Such statistics-
based tools can provide frontline workers a guide to help make service
referral decisions lead to better labor market outcomes.  Targeting, us-
ing statistical profiling methods, has been recognized by the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 1998) as an
approach with broad application to the workforce development pro-
grams of industrial nations.
Evidence on the effectiveness of active labor market policies . . .
suggests that they should be well targeted to the needs of individ-
ual job seekers and the labor market, and that treatment should
start as early as possible in the unemployment spell.  But offering
individual treatment along with early intervention would be very
costly.  There is thus a premium on accurately identifying job
seekers at risk.
The early identification of job seekers at risk of becoming
long-term unemployed is a longstanding and basic endeavor of the
public employment services (PES).  Indeed, good judgment in this
area forms part of the professional competence and work experi-
ence of PES staff.  However, a few countries have gone further by
introducing more formal methods of identifying at-risk job seek-
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ers and laying out procedures on what to do with them.  This is
usually referred to as profiling and is used in this paper to cover
the approach of i) the identification of individuals at risk of long-
term unemployment; ii) the referral to various active labor market
programs.
Such programs have been implemented on a nationwide basis in the
United States and Australia and have received considerable develop-
mental attention in Canada (Eberts and O’Leary 1997).
Under WIA, the need for targeting is greater than under its prede-
cessor, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA).  WIA service referral
principles are summarized relative to those of JTPA in Table 1.1; spe-
cific citations from the acts are provided.  WIA has established a hierar-
chy of services from core, to intensive, to training.  Targeting could be
useful to help determine which users of core services also may benefit
from intensive services.  A refined targeting tool could also help select
which among the intensive services could most help the client, or
whether training is appropriate.
Core services include eligibility determination, outreach, intake
and orientation, initial assessment, job search assistance and placement
assistance, and provision of information relating to labor market condi-
tions, program performance, supportive and follow-up services, as well
as the availability of unemployment insurance (UI) and welfare-to-
work (WTW) programs.  These services are available on a self-serve
basis but frequently require staff assistance.  Intensive reemployment
services universally require staff assistance and include individual and
group counseling, expanded job search workshops, service coordina-
tion assistance, and development of customer service plans.  Training
services may be either in occupational job skills, job search skills, re-
medial reading and mathematics, or on-the-job training.
When thinking about targeting under WIA, it is important to re-
member that current economic conditions do not remain stable forever.
Although the United States experienced an unprecedented period of
prosperity with low inflation in the 1990s, the business cycle has
proven not to be dead.  In periods of recession, statistical targeting
methods are particularly useful.  
While these methods are useful at all times for a selection process
of choosing the right services for the right people, the resource alloca-
tion issue becomes more severe during recessions.  As resources be-
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Table 1.1  WIA Service Principles Relative to JTPA
Increased Reemployment Services Emphasis: The emphasis under WIA is
promoting return to work.  Relative to its predecessor, JTPA, the focus is less
on training and more on searching for work first.  Under JTPA, at least 50
percent of program funds had to be spent on training (JTPA, section
108(b)(4)(B)); WIA has no such requirement.  The emphasis in WIA is using
core services to get a job and moving to intensive services or training only if
necessary to get a job.
Universal Access to Core Services: Section 134(d)(2) of WIA states that
core services “shall be available to adults or dislocated workers, through the
one-stop delivery system . . .”  While there is universal access under WIA, el-
igibility was restricted under JTPA to participation of adults and dislocated
workers found eligible under section 202(d)(1)(A) as economically disadvan-
taged adults or under section 301 as dislocated workers.
Targeting of Intensive Services: Receipt of intensive services under WIA
depends upon the flow of customers from core services, as well as decisions
by one-stop operators.  Intensive services are open to adults and dislocated
workers who are either “unemployed and are unable to obtain employment
through core services” and “determined . . . to be in need of more intensive
services . . . to obtain employment” or employed but are “determined by a
one-stop operator to be in need of such intensive services . . .”  (See WIA sec-
tion 134(d)(3)(i) and (ii).)
Targeting of Training: Training is more broadly available, subject to one-
stop operator decision making, under WIA for both adults and dislocated
workers (section 134(d)(4)) than under JTPA.  This broad availability of
training must be coupled with the priority issue raised in WIA section
134(d)(4)(E): “In the event that funds . . . for adult employment and training
activities . . . are limited, priority shall be given to recipients of public
assistance and other low-income individuals for intensive services and
training . . .”
Core Performance Measures: Although the core standards in JTPA section
106 and WIA section 136(b)(2)(A) appear fairly similar, WIA section 136 is
far more developed and sophisticated.  For example, there is a distinction un-
der section 136(d)(2) about additional information that a state must include,
such as retention and earnings received in unsubsidized employment 12
months after entry into employment (section 136(d)(2)(D)) and entry into un-
subsidized employment related to training received (section 136(d)(2)(A)).
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come relatively more limited in recessions and choices must be made
among a much larger pool of potential customers, these statistical tools
can be adjusted in their application over the business cycle.
The chapters of this book review U.S. experience with targeting
reemployment services and self-employment assistance to UI benefici-
aries most likely to exhaust benefits, suggest other employment pro-
grams that might benefit from targeting, examine Canadian efforts to-
ward targeting reemployment services, and consider prospects for a
new Frontline Decision Support System (FDSS) for one-stop centers.
The remainder of this introductory chapter considers each of these in a
bit more detail.
WORKER PROFILING AND REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES
In November 1993, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation that in-
cluded provisions requiring each state to implement its own permanent
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system.  These
systems identify likely dislocated UI claimants using statistical models
and provide them with job search assistance during the early weeks of
their unemployment.  By law, a WPRS system must identify which
claimants are likely to exhaust their regular UI entitlement and will
need job search assistance services to make a successful transition to
new employment.  WPRS was operational in all states by early 1995.
There is now more than five full years of experience with the operation
of a national program.
The WPRS initiative was based on a large body of experimental re-
search conducted by the states and the federal government (U.S. De-
partment of Labor 1995; Meyer 1995; Corson and Decker 1996).  That
research suggested WPRS systems could be an effective and efficient
way to speed dislocated workers back to productive employment.  The
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) worked with a number of states to
conduct a nationwide evaluation of WPRS with the goal of suggesting
ways to improve the system (Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997).
Implementation of WPRS systems in every state represented a
large effort by the U.S. workforce development community, especially
the UI, Wagner-Peyser, and Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjust-
6 Wandner
ment Assistance (EDWAA) programs.1 Implementation has required
the establishment of operational linkages between employment and
training programs at the state and local levels of government.  It also
has required cooperation between local, state, and federal government
entities.  The WPRS initiative is making referrals to reemployment ser-
vices at an annual rate of about 800,000 workers per year nationwide
(Messenger, Schwartz, and Wandner 1999).  This referral level repre-
sents about one-third of the more than two million workers who be-
come dislocated each year.2
WPRS profiling is a two-step process to identify permanently sep-
arated workers with reemployment difficulty.  First, permanently sepa-
rated workers are identified by screening out two groups of workers:
those subject to recall and/or those subject to union hiring hall agree-
ments.3 These workers must also be UI-eligible as demonstrated by the
requirement that they receive a UI first benefit payment.  Second, the
likelihood of UI benefit exhaustion is predicted using a statistical mod-
el (Wandner 1997, 1998).
For most states the profiling referral model was developed using
logit regression analysis applied to historical data from various state
administrative records.  The dependent variable in the model is usually
a binary variable (i.e., a zero or a 1, depicting whether or not the work-
er exhausted all entitlement to UI benefits).4 The profiling model esti-
mates a probability of UI benefit exhaustion for individuals based on
their individual characteristics and current labor market conditions.
The variables in this model include education, job tenure, change in
employment in previous industry, change in employment in previous
occupation, and local unemployment rate.
Because of federal civil rights legislation, the states were prohibit-
ed from using certain variables as part of their profiling mechanisms,
such as age, race/ethnic group, and gender.  An analysis comparing re-
sults when including and omitting these variables indicated that the ef-
fect of this omission on the predictive power of the profiling model is
generally very small.5
A few states profile based on characteristic screens alone.  The
process involves a small number of characteristics, each of which has a
preset cutoff value or criterion.  Individuals are selected if they meet
the criteria for each screen used.  A number of states that initially used
characteristic screening have decided to convert to statistical models
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because statistical models have proven to be a more flexible and accu-
rate targeting device for making referrals to reemployment services.
For each local workforce development office, UI claimants are
ranked by their exhaustion probabilities—from high to low—to form
the basis for referral to reemployment service providers.  Staff mem-
bers from the service providers work with referred customers to devel-
op an individual service plan.  There is a wide variation among states
regarding the extent of services and the degree of individualization of
each plan.
The WPRS evaluation (Dickinson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997;
Hawkins et al. 1996) found that states were successful in implementing
their statistical profiling models, and the models successfully identified
those UI claimants most likely to exhaust their UI benefits.  States ap-
pear to be successfully determining service capacity for providing
reemployment services.
The Department of Labor (DOL) has recommended that the states
provide a comprehensive and intensive set of reemployment services,
although all participants do not need and probably should not receive
the same set of services.  Rather, the focus should be on the develop-
ment of an individual service plan for each referred worker—to meet
the needs of the individual customer and to avoid an approach that
would be “one size fits all” (U.S. Department of Labor 1994a, Field
Memorandum 35-94).
Reemployment services can be provided by a number of different
organizations, but the usual provider in most states is the Wagner-
Peyser agency, the employment service.  This choice is related to the
history of workforce development programs.  The employment service
and UI were created as two interdependent programs in the 1930s and
have been closely associated at state and local levels ever since.  Nine
out of 10 workforce development local offices around the country
house both Wagner-Peyser and UI units.
In early 1998, DOL established a WPRS policy workgroup consist-
ing of state and federal representatives.  Based on the first three years of
WPRS operation, the workgroup made seven recommendations in its
final report (Messenger, Schwartz, and Wandner 1999).
1) states should update their profiling models regularly,
2) states should profile all claimants who file an initial claim,
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3) states should accelerate their profiling and referral process to
ensure early intervention, 
4) states should improve reemployment services provided to pro-
filed and referred claimants,
5) program linkages should be improved between Wagner-Peyser
Act, JTPA Title III, and UI programs,
6) adequate funding should be devoted to providing more and bet-
ter reemployment services through state WPRS systems, and 
7) WPRS feedback and reporting systems should be improved.
An important consideration is that the state and federal govern-
ments need to devote more resources to reemployment services, be-
cause profiling, no matter how well implemented and targeted, cannot
be effective unless substantial and effective reemployment services are
provided to WPRS participants.  The federal government responded in
FY 1999 by providing $5.2 million in funding for innovative approach-
es to providing reemployment services to dislocated workers collecting
UI and served by the WPRS system.  More recently, Congress provided
$35 million in both the FY 2001 and FY 2002 budgets to provide reem-
ployment services to workers identified as in need by WPRS.
Part I of the book presents two chapters and a panel discussion that
examine the WPRS system in some detail.  Chapter 2, by Rob Olson,
Marisa Kelso, Paul Decker, and Daniel Klepinger, considers the statis-
tical modeling challenge of predicting who among UI recipients is most
likely to exhaust their benefits.  Chapter 3, by Katherine Dickinson,
Paul Decker, and Suzanne Kreutzer, summarizes an evaluation of
WPRS effects in a select group of states.  Chapter 4 reports the panel
discussion involving Pete Fleming, Al Jaloviar, Helen Parker, and Marc
Perrett on the experience of federal and state policymakers with WPRS.
APPLICATIONS OF TARGETING METHODS
Part II of the book examines employment policy applications of
targeting in the United States beyond the WPRS system.  These include
experience with targeting self-employment assistance, the possibility
of targeting reemployment bonuses, optimal training choices for dis-
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placed workers, targeting welfare to work services, and possibilities for
targeting job retention services for welfare recipients who have gained
employment.  Some background on these chapters follows.
Self-Employment
Outside of the WPRS system, targeting participants with a formal
statistical model is now being done for only one other U.S. employ-
ment program: self-employment assistance (SEA).  Indeed, states that
have implemented SEA use exactly the same logit-based targeting
model as is used for WPRS.
From 1990 to 1993, DOL ran SEA experiments in two states, Mas-
sachusetts and Washington.  The experiment conducted in Massachu-
setts used a form of profiling to target participation.  The profiling mod-
el for the experiment was different from the WPRS model, but it used
similar variables to predict likely exhaustion of UI benefits.  Profiling
was also intended to assuage employer concerns that workers who were
not permanently laid off by employers might otherwise be eligible for
SEA.
Based on preliminary impact analysis results from the two SEA ex-
periments available in mid 1993, a provision allowing states to estab-
lish SEA programs as part of their UI programs was enacted into feder-
al law as part of Title V (transitional adjustment assistance) of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) implementation act
(Public Law 103-182, U.S. Department of Labor 1994b).  Signed into
law December 8, 1993, this provision allowed states the option of of-
fering self-employment assistance to profiled UI claimants as an addi-
tional means of helping assist dislocated workers obtain new employ-
ment.  However, SEA authorization was temporary and set to expire in
December 1998 (Orr et al. 1994).  The legislation was enacted because
profiling was believed to target the program to appropriate participants,
and because it was expected to have a neutral impact on the federal
budget.  Cost neutrality resulted from targeting offers to individuals
who likely would have exhausted their UI benefit entitlements in the
absence of the program.
After the temporary authorization for SEA under NAFTA, the final
evaluation report on the SEA experiments in Massachusetts and Wash-
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ington was completed and published by DOL in June 1995.  Based on a
three-year follow-up, offers in the Massachusetts SEA experiment in-
creased participants’ total time employed by nearly 1.9 months and
increased net annual earnings by $5,940 over the three-year follow-
up period.  As a result, the final evaluation report recommended that 
“. . . SEA should be permanently incorporated into the U.S. employ-
ment security and economic development system” (Benus et al. 1995).
In accordance with the 1993 legislation, DOL conducted a review
of the SEA program through 1996.  All state programs used a WPRS
model to target participation offers.  Just as in the Massachusetts exper-
iment, SEA is administered through UI and amounts to a work search
waiver so that weekly UI payments continue while self-employment
activity begins.  Slightly more than 2,600 individuals participated in
SEA programs during 1996 in the five states that had operational pro-
grams at that time (New York, Maine, Oregon, Delaware, and New Jer-
sey).  In addition, based on annual program outcome data submitted by
New York, Oregon, Maine, and Delaware, over two-thirds of SEA pro-
gram participants started their own businesses, and between 18 percent
and 50 percent also worked in wage and salary employment (Vroman
1998).
The states with SEA programs wished to continue them beyond the
sunset date in December 1998.  New York, with the oldest and largest
program, led the effort together with Pennsylvania, which had the
newest program.  Congress authorized a permanent SEA program in
September 1998, and the bill was signed into law on October 28, 1998.
By 2001, eight states had developed and implemented SEA pro-
grams: New York, Maine, Oregon, Delaware, New Jersey, California,
Maryland, and Pennsylvania (in order of program implementation).
Most SEA programs remain small.  Less than 1 percent of all UI recip-
ients participate.  All states require demonstration of the interest and
ability to start and run a small business before granting SEA participa-
tion.  The SEA programs have removed a barrier to self-employment in
the UI law, and instead have actively supported eligible workers in
making the transition from unemployment to self-employment.
Under the new legislation, DOL issued amended federal guidelines
to inform the participating states that they may continue their existing
programs and encourage other states to consider implementing their
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own programs.  SEA remains the same program it was during the five-
year trial period, retaining the requirement that states select participants
using a profiling mechanism.  Profiling relating to potential exhaustion
of UI benefits continues to be a requirement under the new program,
but states are no longer required to submit SEA program plans to DOL
in advance of implementing their programs.6
Chapter 5, by Jon Messenger, Carolyn Peterson-Vaccaro, and
Wayne Vroman, reports on the experience with targeting self-employ-
ment assistance.  This is the only other currently operating statistical
targeting application in U.S. employment policy.  The remaining chap-
ters of Part II suggest further opportunities for formal targeting of em-
ployment services.
Reemployment Bonuses
Between 1984 and 1989, reemployment bonus experiments were
conducted in the states of Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wash-
ington.  Each experiment involved random assignment of UI claimants
to treatment and control groups.  The experiments each offered different
levels of lump sum payments to workers who took new, full-time jobs
within 6 to 12 weeks and stayed employed for at least three to four
months.  These experiments were conducted to learn more about the be-
havioral response of UI recipients to UI program parameters.  In partic-
ular they were tested as a positive incentive for speedy return to work.
The idea of reemployment bonuses originated in Japan, where unem-
ployed workers can receive a cash bonus for accepting a new job.  In
Japan, unemployed workers can receive a bonus once every three years.
UI claimants would improve their economic situation if they went
back to work sooner at similar or better paying jobs than they would
have taken in the absence of bonus offer.  The government sector would
be better off if the cost of the bonus were offset by a decrease in UI
payments to unemployed workers and by an increase in tax receipts
during their longer period of employment.  The Reemployment Act of
1994 proposed to permit states to provide reemployment bonus pro-
grams, but the legislation was not enacted.
All four reemployment bonus experiments had similar eligibility
requirements for inclusion in treatment or control groups.  The re-
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quirements were set to assure that workers filed for or drew UI bene-
fits, to simplify administrative details, and to select workers who had
experienced some degree of work displacement.  Program designs set
the bonus amount, the time period during which workers could quali-
fy for the bonus, and the conditions under which they could receive the
bonus.
A number of lessons have been learned from the bonus experi-
ments.  As predicted by job search theory, cash bonuses have a signifi-
cant impact on job search behavior and lead to reduction in the average
duration of unemployment, resulting in a desirable expedition of reem-
ployment.  Larger bonuses also had the largest impact on unemploy-
ment durations.  As expected from the empirical literature on UI work
disincentives, the bonuses had no effect on wages, indicating no de-
cline in the quality of jobs taken in response to the offer of reemploy-
ment bonuses.  There is also no evidence that the bonuses had any ef-
fect on worker attachment to their previous employer, as they had no
effect on workers subject to recall (Woodbury and Spiegelman 1987;
Decker and O’Leary 1995).
On the other hand, because unemployment durations did not direct-
ly relate to the dollar level of the bonus offer, there was not a continu-
ously increasing response.  The initial findings left uncertainty about
the design of an optimum bonus offer.  None of the options tested were
found to be cost-effective for either the general UI claimant population,
or for claimants similar to dislocated workers.
O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner (1997) reexamined evidence from
the bonus experiments to determine whether a reemployment bonus
targeted to those UI claimants most likely to exhaust benefits would be
more cost-effective.  They found that profiling models similar to those
used by states as part of their WPRS system can be effectively used in
this targeting.  Using these models can increase the cost-effectiveness
of bonus offers by generating larger average reductions in UI benefit
payments than a nontargeted bonus offer.
The single treatment design that emerged as the best candidate for
a targeted reemployment bonus is a low bonus amount, with a long
qualification period, targeted to the half of claimants most likely to ex-
haust their UI benefit entitlement.  Such a targeted bonus offer emerged
as a realistic prospect for a cost-effective early intervention strategy to
promote reemployment.  It was estimated to yield appreciable net ben-
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efits to the UI trust fund if implemented as a permanent national pro-
gram.
Chapter 6, by Christopher O’Leary, Paul Decker, and Stephen
Wandner, summarizes the authors’ research on targeting reemployment
bonuses offered to UI beneficiaries in the states of Pennsylvania and
Washington using WPRS models.
Choice of Training
Improved targeting of training could be a powerful tool to guide
dislocated workers to the type of training proven to be most cost-effec-
tive.  Based on their labor market and personal characteristics, dislocat-
ed workers could be referred to different types of training such that
their employment and earnings outcomes could be improved over a
simple random assignment process.
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1999) studied the training deci-
sions of displaced workers in the state of Washington during the early
1990s, examining the community college courses taken by these work-
ers.  Data on dislocated workers enrolled in 25 Washington community
colleges included the types of courses they took, their grades, and the
period of time in which they were enrolled.  Dislocated worker status
and reemployment earnings history were identified using UI wage
records.
The study divided training into nine categories.  It found that, aver-
aging across all kinds of training, displaced workers who received
training through community colleges experienced small earnings gains.
However, these overall mean effects masked the fact that high earning
gains accrued to those taking quantitative or technical courses; specifi-
cally, courses in three categories: health services, technical skills, and
science and mathematics. The study also examined how the labor mar-
ket and personal characteristics of dislocated workers affected their en-
rollment and participation in community college.  Rates of enrollment,
training, and training completion were found to be related to education-
al level, industry, prior wages, urbanization, job tenure, age at separa-
tion, gender, and minority status.
The impact of participation by dislocated workers in community
college training on earnings was an increase in quarterly earnings of
about $6 for each credit earned.  The distribution of earnings gains var-
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ied by minority status, age, tenure at displacement, industry, region of
the state, and prior education.  The highest return to community college
schooling accrued to workers with high tenure, more prior schooling,
and those in the state’s largest labor market (Seattle).  The study con-
cluded that training for dislocated workers was most cost-effective
when provided in three (health services, technical skills, and math and
science) of nine types of training studied, and that the effectiveness of
providing this training can be increased by targeting to those workers
who can achieve the greatest earnings gains from this training.
Chapter 7, by Louis Jacobson, Robert Lalonde, and Daniel Sulli-
van, summarizes the authors’ research on returns to different types of
community college training in Washington for dislocated workers.
Welfare-to-Work
In August 1996, federal welfare reform legislation was enacted in
the form of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Rec-
onciliation Act.  The new program, called Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF), replaced Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC).  In August 1997, to support the employment em-
phasis of TANF, the DOL-administered welfare-to-work (WTW) pro-
gram was enacted.  It provided $3 billion to states and localities to as-
sist welfare recipients in obtaining and retaining employment.  Under
welfare reform, the WTW program provides employment assistance to
welfare recipients using a “work first” approach, such that recipients
receive assistance in finding jobs first before being referred, as needed,
for additional services, such as education and training.  They can re-
ceive training as well as other postemployment services, such as child
care and transportation assistance, but generally only after they be-
come employed.
States have both TANF and WTW federal funding to assist wel-
fare recipients in their employment efforts.  TANF provides for block
grant funding to states, with funding fixed at the 1994 level.  Welfare
rolls have fallen sharply, however, leaving a substantial budget for as-
sisting TANF recipients in achieving initial employment, as well as
helping former welfare recipients retain their jobs and advance their
careers.
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WTW and similar programs initiated by the states are particularly
amenable to targeting.  Welfare recipients vary a great deal in their pri-
or labor force attachments, which makes their abilities to become em-
ployed very different.  Welfare recipients with strong work histories
need relatively less assistance, while those with no work experience
have very great needs.  Further, while many welfare recipients can get a
job, other barriers to steady employment and career growth exist, in-
cluding having reliable child care and transportation.
Similar to dislocated workers who provide data used for statistical
targeting when they file for UI benefits, welfare applicants provide wel-
fare and work-first agencies similar data that could be used to benefit
their career development choices.
Welfare targeting can be used by the WTW agency whether it is the
local workforce development agency or the local welfare agency.  Re-
gardless of the location, service to clients can be improved by making
use of client data to more effectively target employment services.  The
existence of targeting mechanisms may also make it easier to encour-
age cooperation between the workforce development and welfare agen-
cies when the functions are separated.
The Department of Labor is interested in helping local WTW agen-
cies make more informed choices about the provision of employment
services to welfare recipients.  To that end, DOL decided to test whether
a statistical targeting mechanism could be developed to determine
which welfare recipients should receive particular types of WTW ser-
vices.  DOL funded the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
to develop and test the use of WTW profiling to help welfare recipients
find their initial jobs.  The model was developed during 1997.  During
1998 and 1999, the Upjohn Institute tested this model in Michigan in the
Kalamazoo-St. Joseph county service delivery area.  The WTW service
targeting model reversed the concept of WPRS profiling to instead esti-
mate the probability of becoming employed.  The variables used to ex-
plain the propensity for employment reflect labor market experience and
characteristics of the welfare population (Eberts 1997).  They are
1) age at time of enrollment, 
2) parental status, 
3) educational attainment, 
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4) AFDC/TANF history,
5) target group (long-term welfare recipient, older children, little
or no work experience or education), 
6) prior employment, and 
7) compliance history in previous WTW enrollment.  
Chapter 8, by Randall Eberts, reports on a field experiment for target-
ing WTW services, which was done in Kalamazoo and St. Joseph coun-
ties in Michigan.  WTW profiling models were also developed by
Broward County, Florida, with a number of other states interested in
trying the approach.
Job Retention and Advancement by Former Welfare Recipients
As more welfare recipients become employed, it has become clear
that finding a job is just the first step toward becoming a stable working
member of the labor force.  In recognition of this reality, states have
been spending increasing portions of their TANF and WTW funds on
job retention and advancement.  As part of this effort, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) has sponsored a number of
research projects dealing with job retention.  Included in these projects
is an analysis of what postemployment services are needed and how to
target these services to those most in need of them.  HHS was interest-
ed to see if such analysis would allow the design of programs that en-
courage job retention and advancement or, in the case of job loss, rapid
reemployment.
Rangarajan, Schochet, and Chu (1998) examined the feasibility of
targeting welfare recipients who initially find jobs for job retention ser-
vices based on their personal and labor market characteristics.  As with
dislocated worker profiling, the goal of the study was to try to improve
the efficiency of resource use, targeting postemployment services to
clients most in need, as measured by those welfare recipients who are
most likely to have long periods without employment.
Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data, the study
constructed a nationally representative sample of welfare recipients
who found jobs during the panel period and analyzed their employment
experiences over the five-year period after they entered the labor force.
Similar to other profiling methods, Rangarajan, Schochet, and Chu de-
Targeting Employment Services under the WIA 17
veloped regression models for predicting which sample members might
have negative employment outcomes, using individual and labor mar-
ket characteristics available in welfare administrative data.  They were
able to determine the weighted effect of each factor on employment.
Their models were sufficient to target job retention services by identi-
fying individuals who initially find jobs but have the greatest risk of
subsequent periods without employment.
The variables used to predict long periods without employment are
1) age younger than 20 years when first applied for welfare, 
2) employed less than half the time in year prior to job start, 
3) no high school diploma/GED, 
4) presence of preschool child, 
5) wage less than $8.00 per hour, 
6) no fringe benefits, 
7) no valid driver’s license, and
8) has health limitations.
The study found that the characteristics most strongly related to spells
without employment were working without fringe benefits and having
a health limitation.  The result of this analysis again shows that a series
of personal and labor market characteristics can be used to identify 
who could benefit most by referral to services—in this case, postem-
ployment services.
Chapter 9, by Anu Rangarajan, Peter Schochet, and Dexter Chu, re-
views possibilities for targeting job retention services for welfare recip-
ients who have gained employment.
CANADIAN APPROACHES FOR TARGETING
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
Part III of the book presents two chapters that report on the Canadi-
an perspective for targeting employment services.  Chapter 10, by Ter-
ry Colpitts, discusses the Service and Outcome Measurement System
(SOMS) developed by Human Resources Development Canada to be a
tool for promoting employment.  SOMS was intended to help frontline
18 Wandner
staff in local public employment service offices counsel job seekers
about the best strategies for gaining employment and to assist analysts
and managers in determining the best employment and/or training
strategies for specific client groups.  A microcomputer-based prototype
of SOMS was built in 1994.
SOMS has not been adopted in Canada; however, many useful les-
sons were learned in the course of its development and pilot testing.
Chapter 10 describes the most important lessons and tells the story of
SOMS.  The policy context, technical structure, and intended use of
SOMS by frontline staff and management are all discussed.  The chap-
ter concludes by reviewing some recent events in SOMS development
and reflecting on SOMS prospects for the future.
To date, Canada has not developed a policy for targeting services to
the long-term unemployed.  It has not been a pressing concern, because
until recently the incidence of long-term unemployment in Canada has
been low.  Public concern about long-term unemployment surfaced in
the 1990s as the ratio of unemployment compensation beneficiaries to
all unemployed (B/U) fell dramatically from 0.83 in 1989 to 0.42 in
1997.  Research revealed that about half of this drop was due to tight-
ening of the unemployment compensation system, but the other half
was due to changes in the nature of the labor market.  In particular, B/U
dropped because the share of unemployed Canadians who have not
worked for the last 12 months has nearly doubled, from 20.8 percent in
1989 to 38.4 percent in 1997.7
Chapter 11, by Ging Wong, Harold Henson, and Arun Roy, docu-
ments the rise in Canadian long-term unemployment and the related
trends in exhaustion of unemployment compensation entitlement.  The
chapter then reports on an empirical exercise using Canadian data,
which attempts early identification of individuals who are at risk of re-
maining jobless for 52 weeks or more.  Such a model, however, is use-
ful only if linked to effective employment measures.  Consequently,
the chapter then reports which services are most likely to promote
reemployment for those at risk of long-term joblessness.  For Cana-
dian unemployment compensation recipients, estimates are provid-
ed on how net benefits of interventions vary depending upon the tim-
ing of the intervention.  Summary and concluding remarks are also
provided.
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NEW DIRECTIONS FOR TARGETING 
EMPLOYMENT SERVICES
The Department of Labor is working with the Upjohn Institute to
pilot test a frontline decision support system (FDSS) for workforce de-
velopment staff in one-stop centers.  The goal of FDSS is to assist staff
in quickly assessing and properly targeting services to customers.
FDSS tools are being tested in new WIA operating systems in Georgia
and Washington.
Chapter 12, by Randall Eberts, and Christopher O’Leary, and Kelly
DeRango, reports on efforts to develop an FDSS for targeting reem-
ployment services in a one-stop environment.  FDSS is comprised of
two main modules: systematic job search and service referral.
The systematic job search module is a means for structured search-
ing of vacancy listings.  The module informs job seekers about their
prospects for returning to a job like their prior one, provides a realistic
assessment of likely reemployment earnings, and identifies occupations
related to the prior one.  The first component is called the industry tran-
sition component.  It provides an estimate of the likelihood that a cus-
tomer can find a job in his or her prior industry.  The second component
provides a realistic assessment of likely reemployment compensation
levels.  This feature relies on an earnings algorithm which is a statisti-
cal model based on personal characteristics, work history, prior earn-
ings, and educational attainment to predict earnings upon reemploy-
ment.  The third component is the related-occupations algorithm.  The
algorithm offers individuals who have exhausted job prospects within
their prior occupation a list of other occupations that are similar to their
prior occupation.
The second module of FDSS is the service referral component.
The primary purpose is to identify the sequence of activities that most
often lead to successful employment.  The service referral module uses
information about the characteristics and outcomes of individuals who
have recently participated in and completed core, intensive, and train-
ing services.  This information is used to estimate the statistical rela-
tionships between personal attributes and outcomes.  This algorithm
has two basic components.  The first is an estimate of a person’s em-
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ployability, or likelihood of finding a job.  The second component is a
delineation of the paths, or sequential combinations of services, that
lead to successful outcomes.  By conditioning these paths on the em-
ployability of a specific customer, the algorithm can offer estimates of
the effectiveness of various programs for individuals with specific mea-
surable characteristics.
An FDSS pilot is in process in Georgia.  The data requirements and
system design of FDSS have been completed, and it is expected to be
implemented in the Athens and Cobb-Cherokee career centers in mid
2002.  A decision will then be made whether to implement the system
statewide.  Based on input from Georgia users, a second, revised sys-
tem will then be completed.  Pilot implementation efforts in Washing-
ton are expected to start after the Washington one-stop computer sys-
tem is operational.  Operational system documentation and a technical
assistance guide will be developed for use in other states.  Training will
then be provided for implementation in other states.
Chapter 13 concludes the book, with a panel discussion involving
Rich Hobbie, Jim Finch, Chuck Middlebrooks, and Jack Weidenbach
on the experience with and future plans of the states for targeting em-
ployment services.
ADDITIONAL OPTIONS FOR TARGETING
Statistical targeting methods can be applied to a wide number of
workforce development programs.  The only requirement is that they
have an appropriate set of historical administrative data that can be ap-
plied to developing accurate statistical targeting methods.  Below are
some examples of possible additional applications that are not dis-
cussed elsewhere in this book but could be developed.
Training Targeting for Welfare Recipients 
and Low-Wage Workers
An extension of the training targeting approach for dislocated
workers (as in Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1999) might be an ap-
plication to other adult workers, particularly low-wage workers and
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current and former welfare recipients.  Such models would be valuable
in determining whom to train among a large number of low-wage
workers who may be coming to one-stop centers. developing such
models for former welfare recipients would need to take into consider-
ation the work-first environment of welfare reform.
Underemployed Workers (Skills Mismatch)
Under WIA, many more employed workers are likely to visit/ac-
cess the one-stop centers in search of career advancement, labor market
information, and education and training opportunities.  One group of
employed workers for whom mediated services may be particularly ef-
fective is underemployed workers, especially those with skills that
greatly exceed the skill set needed for their current jobs.  A particularly
cost-effective approach may be to target, identify, and assist these
workers in finding jobs that better match their skills.  The result should
be a substantial increase in earnings for workers and productivity for
society.
Targeting UI Non-Filers among Dislocated Workers
About two-thirds of all dislocated workers apply for UI, and a
much larger portion of those dislocated workers who remain unem-
ployed for five or more weeks claim UI.  However, a significant mi-
nority of dislocated workers never apply for UI.  The one-stop centers
can provide information about UI benefits that may result in increased
application rates for the program.  These workers will be able to apply
for UI benefits in the center, either in person or by telephone.  In ad-
dition, the availability of wage data as part of FDSS could be used to
calculate the monetary eligibility for UI benefits.  Supplying such in-
formation also could increase filing for UI benefits, and the net effect
of the one-stop center may be to increase recipiency rates for UI ben-
efits.
For those dislocated workers who choose not to apply for UI, how-
ever, profiling would be useful—using the state WPRS model—to
make a determination of the need for reemployment services similar to
that done under the WPRS system.  It should be noted, however, that
profiling within the one-stop center and the resulting identification of
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workers in need of services and their referral to services would not re-
sult in mandatory participation in those services.
Job Corps Selection and Retention
Another possible application of targeting to a national DOL pro-
gram would be as a guide for selection of Job Corps participants.  Us-
ing data on past participants, individuals could be profiled to assist in
the selection of participants based on whether they have characteristics
similar to successful Job Corps graduates.
For newly enrolled Job Corps participants, profiling could also be
used to determine which individuals are most likely to drop out of the
Job Corps prior to graduation.  This information could be used to target
the provision of remedial assistance that could increase the Job Corps
retention rate.
The effect of targeting efforts, combined with improved selection
processes and provision of remedial assistance, could increase the cost-
effectiveness of the Job Corps by reducing the program’s drop-out rate.
Dynarski and Gleason (forthcoming) conducted an analysis for predict-
ing which students are most likely to drop out of school, indicating that
the development of such methods could yield positive results.
Notes
1. The EDWAA program was the principal JTPA dislocated worker program in the
United States.  It traditionally recruited participants through either 1) early outreach
(“rapid response”) to workers experiencing mass layoffs or plant shutdowns, or 2)
walk-ins to their local intake centers.  The employment service serves all employed
and unemployed workers, including dislocated workers.  Both programs have sup-
plemented recruitment of program participants with WPRS referral and been active
participants in the overall WPRS system.  For the EDWAA program, most but not
necessarily all WPRS-referred workers are eligible for EDWAA services.
2. The term dislocated worker refers to workers who are permanently laid off from
long-tenured jobs.  These workers tend to suffer extended periods of joblessness
and earn lower incomes when they become reemployed.  For the EDWAA pro-
gram, section 301(a) of Title III of JTPA in part, defined eligible dislocated work-
ers as “individuals who: 1) have been terminated or laid off or who have received
a notice of termination or layoff from employment, are eligible for or have ex-
hausted their entitlement to unemployment compensation, and are unlikely to re-
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turn to their previous industry or occupation, and 2) have been terminated or have
received a notice of termination of employment, as a result of any permanent or
any substantial layoff at a plant, facility or enterprise . . .”  The Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS), on the other hand, collects data about displaced workers in its bi-
ennial survey.  It defines displaced workers as workers who permanently lost their
jobs because their plant or company closed or moved, there was insufficient work
for them to do, or their positions or shifts were abolished.  BLS distinguishes be-
tween long-tenured workers who lost jobs they had held for three years or more,
and displaced workers regardless of tenure.  This chapter does not distinguish be-
tween the terms “dislocated” and “displaced” workers; it uses the former term in
all cases.
3. The WPRS system is designed to provide reemployment services to permanently
separated workers who are likely to be unemployed for long periods in their search
for new jobs. Workers who find their jobs exclusively through union hiring halls,
e.g., longshoremen, are considered to be job attached and not searching for new
jobs; they are waiting to return to their old jobs. They are not eligible to participate
in WPRS reemployment services.
4. Benefit exhaustion takes place when claimants draw their potential duration of reg-
ular benefits.  Potential duration usually depends on prior earnings.  The maximum
potential duration is 26 weeks in all states except Massachusetts and Washington,
where it is 30 weeks.
5. Prohibited variables and the effect of their omission are discussed in U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (1994a), pp. 63 and 151–152. 
6. UI Program Letter 11-98, Permanent Authorization of the Self-Employment Assis-
tance Program, issued on December 17, 1998.
7. See OECD (1998, pp. 41 and 43).  Note that the number used in the analysis is not
the long-term unemployed, but those not employed for a year, which includes both
unemployed and out of the labor force.
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